Abstract-Inspired by successful biological collective decision mechanisms such as honey bees searching for a new colony or the collective navigation of fish schools, we consider a scenario where a large number of agents engaged in a dynamic game have to make a choice among a finite set of different potential target destinations. Each individual both influences and is influenced by the group's decision, as represented by the mean trajectory of all agents. The model can be interpreted as a stylized version of opinion crystallization in an election for example. In the most general formulation, agents' biases are dictated by a combination of initial position, individual dynamics parameters, and a priori individual preference. Agents are assumed linear and coupled through a modified form of quadratic cost, whereby the terminal cost captures the discrete choice component of the problem. Following the mean field games methodology, we identify sufficient conditions under which allocations of destination choices over agents lead to self-replication of the overall mean trajectory under the best response by the agents. Importantly, we establish that when the number of agents increases sufficiently, 1) the best response strategies to the self-replicating mean trajectories qualify as epsilon-Nash equilibria of the population game; and 2) these epsilon-Nash strategies can be computed solely based on the knowledge of the joint probability distribution of the initial conditions, dynamics parameters, and destination preferences, now viewed as random variables. Our results are illustrated through numerical simulations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
C OLLECTIVE decision making is a common phenomenon in social structures ranging from animal populations [3] , [4] to human societies [5] . Examples include honey bees searching for a new colony [6] , [7] , the navigation of fish schools [8] , [9] , or quorum sensing [10] . Collective decisions involve dynamic "microscopic-macroscopic" or "individual-social" interactions. On the one hand, individual choices are socially influenced, that is, influenced by the behavior of the group. On the other hand, the collective behavior itself results from aggregating individual choices.
In elections, for example, an interplay between individual interests and collective opinion swings leads to the crystallization of final decisions [5] , [11] . Our model may be an abstract representation of this process, where: 1) individual opinion dynamics are described in a state-space form [11] ; 2) changing one's opinion requires an effort but deviation from the majority's opinion involves a discomfort; and 3) a choice must be made before a finite deadline. The classical voter model [12] describes the evolution of opinions in an election. It considers a group of agents choosing between two alternatives. At each instant, the probability that an individual switches from one alternative to the other depends on its current choice, the others' states, as well as the communication graph. In this paper, we consider a game theoretic approach to a limited randomness version of this problem, whereby agents, given enough deterministic or probabilistic information on the initial spatial distribution and preferences of other agents, crystallize at the outset what their final choices will be, through anticipation of the group behavior over the control horizon. Movement in opinion space toward a final choice requires costly efforts from voters. At the same time, they experience discomfort whenever their individual state differs from the mean population state.
"Homing" optimal control problems, first introduced by Whittle and Gait in [13] and studied later in [14] - [17] , for example, are concerned with a single agent trying to reach one of multiple predefined final states. Here, we consider a similar fundamental issue but in a multiagent setting. A large number of agents initially spread out in R n need to move within a finite-time horizon to one of multiple possible home or target destinations. They must do so while trying to remain tightly grouped and expending as little control effort as possible. Our goal is to model situations in which the choice made by each agent regarding which destination to reach both influences and depends on the behavior of the population. For example, when honey bees determine their next site to establish a colony they must make a choice between different alternatives based on the information provided by scouts, who are themselves part of the group. Even though certain colonies can be easier to reach and are more attractive for some bees, following the majority is still a priority to enhance the foraging ability [6] , [7] . In animal collective navigation [18] , [19] , discrete choices must be made regarding the route to take, but at the same time, staying with the group offers better protection against predators [8] .
Similarly, consider a situation as in [20] - [22] , where a collection of robots is exploring an unknown terrain and should choose between multiple potential sites of interest to visit. The robots can possibly split, but each subgroup should remain sufficiently large to carry out collective tasks of interest [23] - [26] . Our framework allows modeling such a situation and provides parameters indicating for each robot the attractiveness of the sites and the cost of deviating from the population's centroid. Moreover, we look for a coordination strategy that requires a limited amount of communication, thus increasing the robustness of our solution against intermittent loss of connectivity within the group for example. We do so by relying on the law of large numbers and the mean-field games (MFG) methodology, where the agents only need to learn the initial distribution of the group [27] (for example, through a consensus-like algorithm), in order to compute an optimal decentralized control strategy. In practice, in a finite group, the agents would also have to communicate their states periodically in order to compensate for the prediction error due to the fact that the MFG methodology assumes an infinite population.
A related topic in economics is discrete choice models where an agent makes a choice between multiple alternatives such as mode of transportation [28] , entry and withdrawal from the labor market, residential location [29] , or a physician [30] . In many circumstances, these individual choices are influenced by the so-called "Peer Effect," "Neighborhood Effect," or "Social Effect." In particular, Brock and Durlauf [31] use an approach similar to MFG [32] , [33] and inspired by statistical mechanics to study a static binary discrete choice model with a large number of agents, which takes into account the effect of the agents' interdependence on the individual choices. In their model, the individual choices are influenced by the mean of the other agents' choices, while for an infinite size population, the impact of an isolated individual choice on this mean is negligible. The authors show that in an infinite size rational population, each agent can predict this mean as the result of a fixed point calculation, and makes a decentralized choice based upon its prediction. Moreover, multiple anticipated means may exist. Our analysis leads to similar insights for a dynamic noncooperative multiple choice game including situations where the agents have limited information about the dynamics of other agents.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND CONTRIBUTIONS
In this section, we formulate our problem, state our main contributions and provide an outline for the rest of this paper.
A. Deterministic Initial Conditions
We consider a dynamic noncooperative game involving N players with identical linear dynamicṡ
where x i ∈ R n is the state of agent i and u i ∈ R m its control input. Player i is associated with an individual cost functional
. . , l}) are the destination points, q and r are positive constants, and M is a large positive number. The running cost requires the agents to develop as little effort as possible while moving and to stay grouped around the mean of the populationx. Moreover, each agent should reach before final time T one of the destinations p j , j ∈ {1, . . . , l}. Otherwise, it is strongly penalized by the terminal cost. Hence, the overall individual cost captures the problem faced by each agent of deciding between a finite set of alternatives, while trying to remain close to the mean population trajectory. It is sometimes convenient to write the costs in a game theoretic form, i.e., J i (u i , u −i ), where
We seek -Nash strategies, i.e., such that an agent can benefit at most through unilateral deviant behavior, with going to zero as N goes to infinity [34] . We assume that each agent can observe only its own state and the initial states of the other agents.
Definition 1: Consider N players, a set of strategy profiles S = S 1 × · · · × S N and for each player i, a payoff function
called an -Nash equilibrium with respect to the costs J i if there exists an > 0 such that for any fixed i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and for
Inspired by the framework of the MFG theory [23] , [32] - [36] discussed in Section II-C, we develop in this paper, a class of decentralized strategies satisfying a certain fixed point requirement. In particular, under the assumption of a continuum of agents, the problem of computing an agent's best response to a given macroscopic behavior of the population turns out to be an optimal control problem. Hence, the terms "best response" and "optimal control law/strategy" of the agents are used interchangeably in this paper. The fixed point requirement originates from the fact that collectively, the agents' best responses must reproduce the assumed macroscopic behavior. Identification of the strategies requires only that an agent knows its own state and the initial states of the other agents. As we later show, when the number of agents N is sufficiently large, these fixed-point-based strategies achieve their meaning as -Nash equilibria.
B. Random Initial Conditions
As N goes to infinity, it is also convenient to think of the initial states as realizations of random variables resulting from a common probability distribution function in a collection of independent experiments. Agent i is then associated with the following adequately modified cost:
We establish that an agent needs only to know its own state and the common probability distribution of initial states to construct one of the decentralized fixed point based strategies alluded to earlier. In this case, the only randomness lies in the agents' initial conditions, and the control strategies, while expressed as state feedback laws, correspond in effect to open-loop policies [37] .
C. MFG Approach and Our Contributions
The MFG approach is concerned with a class of dynamic noncooperative games involving a large number of players where the individual strategies are considerably affected by the mass behavior, while the influence of isolated individual actions on the group is negligible. Linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) MFG formulations were developed in [32] , [34] , and [35] , while the general nonlinear stochastic framework was considered in [33] and [38] - [40] . To compute a Nash equilibrium, one has to produce in general N fixed point trajectories
(the average of the population without player j). As the size N of the population increases to infinity, these trajectories become indistinguishable. The MFG approach posits at the outset an infinite population to which one can ascribe a deterministic although initially unknown macroscopic behavior. Hence, one starts by assuming that the mean field contributed termx in the cost (2) or (3) is given, denotedx. The cost functions being now decoupled, each agent optimally tracksx (i.e., computes its best response tox). The resulting control laws (best responses) are decentralized. This analysis of the tracking problem is presented in Section III. With the agents implementing the resulting decentralized strategies, a new candidate average path is obtained by computing the corresponding mean population trajectory. Indeed, and it is a fundamental argument in MFG analysis, asymptotically as the population grows, the posited tracked path is an acceptable candidate only if it is reproduced as the mean of the agents when they optimally respond to it. Thus, we look for candidate trajectories that are fixed points of the tracked path to tracked path map defined previously. In Section IV, these fixed points are studied for the deterministic initial conditions with a finite population, and an explicit expression is obtained by assuming that each agent knows the exact initial states of all other agents. The alternative probabilistic description of the agents' initial states is explored in Section V. In Section VI, we further generalize the problem formulation to include initial preferences toward the target destinations. Moreover, we consider that the agents have nonuniform dynamics and that each agent has limited information about the other agents dynamic parameters in the form of a statistical distribution over the matrices A and B. Section VII shows that the decentralized strategies developed when tracking the fixed point mean trajectories constitute -Nash equilibria in all the cases considered previously, with going to zero as N goes to infinity. In Section VIII, we provide some numerical simulation results, while Section IX presents our conclusions.
The main contributions of this paper include the following. 1) We introduce a novel class of linear quadratic nonconvex games aimed at characterizing solutions of collective discrete choice problems in a variety of applications. 2) We show that an agent with knowledge about the dynamic parameters and initial preferences of the other agents can make its choice by observing only the initial conditions of the players (in the case of deterministic initial conditions), or by knowing their initial probability distribution (in the case of random initial conditions). 3) In the uniform dynamics case, we characterize the way the population splits between the destination points. In fact, we construct a finite-dimensional map, which we call the "choice distribution map" (CDM), such that the probability distribution of the choices between the alternatives is a fixed point of this map. In the probabilistic version of the problem, this corresponds to a fixed point vector equation of dimension l (total number of available destinations). Thus, the computation of the corresponding strategies can be considerably simplified relative to that of the finite N case, which requires comparing the performance of l N possible deployments of the N agents over l destinations. 4) We prove the existence of a decentralized -Nash equilibrium, and in the uniform dynamics case, we develop a method to compute it. In essence, this indicates that our simplified and decentralized infinite-populationbased control policies induce Nash equilibria asymptotically as N tends to infinity. We further detail here some more technical aspects of our contribution. Although we rely on the MFG methodology in order to analyze the behavior of many agents choosing one of the available destinations, our model is not standard with respect to the LQG MFG literature. Specifically, our cost is nonconvex and nonsmooth (the final cost is a minimum of l quadratic functions), in order to capture the combinatorial aspect of the discrete decision-making problem. Hence, the existence proofs for a fixed point rely here on topological fixed point theorems rather than a contraction argument as in [32] . One of the main contributions of this paper is also to show that in case of a uniform population, the infinite-dimensional MFG fixed point problem [33] , [38] has a finite-dimensional version that can be characterized via Brouwer's fixed point theorem [41] . For a nonuniform population, the existence of a fixed point mean trajectory relies on an abstract fixed point theorem, namely Schauder's fixed point theorem [41] . In both cases, to solve the MFG equation system, one needs to know the initial probability distribution of the players, whereas in the standard LQG MFG problems, it is sufficient to know the initial mean to anticipate the macroscopic behavior. Thus, in a nutshell, the theoretical tools needed to address this new formulation are thoroughly different. Further highlighting the differences between the two problems, the control laws when extending the current formulation to the stochastic dynamics case are entirely different from the LQG case [42] .
Preliminary versions of our results appeared in the conference papers [1] and [2] . Here, we provide a unified discussion of our collective choice model for the deterministic and stochastic scenarios, as well as more extensive results. Many of the proofs were omitted from the conference papers due to space limitations and can be found here. The simulation section is also expanded with respect to [1] and [2] and provides additional insight on the role of the different parameters in the model.
D. Notation
The following notation is used throughout this paper. We denote by C(X, Y ) the set of continuous functions from a normed vector space X to Y ⊂ R k with the standard supremum norm . ∞ . We fix a generic probability space (Ω, F , P ) and denote by P (A) the probability of an event A and by E(X) the expectation of a random variable X. The indicator function of a subset X is denoted by 1 X and its interior by • X. We denote by |X| the size of a finite set X. The transpose of a matrix M is denoted by M T . We denote by I k the identity k × k matrix. The subscript i is used to index entities related to the agents, while the subscripts j and k are used to index entities related to the home destinations. We denote by [x] m the mth component of a vector x.
III. TRACKING PROBLEM AND BASINS OF ATTRACTION
In this section, we compute the agents' best responses (tracking problem) to the mean field contributed termx. We establish the existence of anx dependent partition of the state space into l basins of attraction, each associated with a distinct destination for all agents initially situated in it.
A. Tracking Problem
Following the MFG approach, we assume the trajectoryx(t) in (2) and (3) to be given for now and call itx(t). The cost functions (2) and (3) can be written as the minimum of l linear quadratic tracking cost functions, each corresponding to a destination point
where
Moreover, inf
. Assuming a full (local) state feedback, the optimal control law for (4) u * i is the optimal control law of the less costly linear quadratic tracking problem, that is,
ik is the optimal solution of the simple linear quadratic tracking problem with cost function J ik .
In the following, we partition the space R n into l regions (basins of attraction), each corresponding to a distinct destination point, such that if an agent is initially in one of these basins, the linear tracking problem associated with the corresponding destination point is the least costly. We recall the optimal control laws [43] , u *
. . , l}, with the corresponding optimal costs
where Γ, β k , and δ k are, respectively, matrix-, vector-, and realvalued functions satisfying the following backward propagating differential equations:
We define the basins of attraction
, then the smallest optimal (simple) cost is J * ij , and player i goes toward the corresponding destination point p j .
Assumption 1: Conventionally, we assume that if
, for some j 1 < . . . < j k , then the player i goes toward p j 1 . Under Assumptions 2 and 5 (defined in Sections V and VI), this convention does not affect the analysis in case of random initial conditions.
We summarize the aforementioned analysis in the following lemma.
Lemma 1: Under Assumption 1, the tracking problem (4) has a unique optimal control law
where Γ, β j , and δ j are the unique solutions of (6a)-(6c). The optimal control laws (8) depend on the local state x i and on the tracked pathx(t) via D j and β j . As mentioned previously, each agent should reach one of the predefined destinations. We show in the next lemma that for any horizon length T , M can be made large enough that each agent reaches an arbitrarily small neighborhood of some destination point by applying the control law (8) . The result is proved for tracked pathsx(t) that are uniformly bounded with respect to M , a property that is shown to hold later in Lemma 9 for the desired tracked paths (fixed point tracked paths).
Lemma 2: Suppose that the pair (A, B) is controllable, and for each M > 0, the agents are optimally tracking a pathx M (t). We suppose that the familyx M (t) is uniformly bounded with respect to M for the norm ( Proof: See Appendix A. Given any continuous pathx(t), there exist l basins of attraction where all the agents initially in D j (x) prefer going toward p j . Therefore, the mean of the population is highly dependent on the structure of D j (x). In the next paragraph, we provide an explicit form of these basins.
B. Basins of Attraction
We start by giving an explicit solution of (6b) and (6c). Let
and
. Two main properties of the state transition matrix Φ are used in this paper, namely the matrix Φ(η 1 , η 2 ) has an inverse Φ(η 2 , η 1 ) and the state transition matrixΦ(η 1 , η 2 ) of −Π T (i.e., solution of (9), where Π in the right-hand side of (9) is replaced by −Π T ) is equal to Φ(η 2 , η 1 )
T . For more details about the properties of the state transition matrix, one can refer to [44] . The unique solution of (6b) and (6c) is
By replacing (10) in the expression of D j (x), (7) can be written
Hence, we see from (11) that the regions D j (x) for a givenx are separated by hyperplanes.
IV. FIXED POINT-DETERMINISTIC INITIAL CONDITIONS
Having computed the best responses to an arbitraryx, we now seek a continuous pathx(t) that is sustainable, in the sense that it can be replicated by the average of the agents under their best responses to it. We start by analyzing a finite size population where the initial state of each agent is known to all agents. We exhibit a one to one map between the sustainable paths and the fixed points of a CDM, itself a finite-dimensional operator, the fixed points of which characterize the set of fractions of agents going to each one of the possible destinations. An algorithm is proposed to compute these fixed points and the associated agent trajectories.
We start our search for the desired pathx(t) by computing the meanx(t) when tracking any continuous pathx(t). The dynamics of the mean when trackingx
where Φ is defined in (9),
N p j , and λ j (x) is the number of agents initially in D j (x), which therefore pick p j as a destination. We obtain (13) by substituting (10) into (8) and the resulting control law in (1) to subsequently computex = 1/N N i=1 x i and its derivative. Thus, the mean of the populationx when tracking any continuous pathx is the image ofx by a composite map G = G 2 • G 1 , where
is the unique solution of (13) in which λ j (x) is equal to an arbitrary λ j , j ∈ {1, . . . , l}. The desired path describing the mean trajectory is a fixed point of G. In the following, we construct an one to one map between the fixed points of G and the fixed points of a finite-dimensional operator F describing the way the population splits between the destination points. We define the following quantities:
where P and Φ P (t, η) are the unique solutions oḟ
We define the CDM F from {0, . . . , N} l into itself, such that for all λ ∈ {0, . . . , N} l ,
where (16) and (17) are defined to compute the family of paths in which lies the set of fixed points. The regions H λ j are the basins of attraction associated with this family and the function F counts the number of initial conditions in each H λ j . We now state the main result of this section.
Theorem 3: The pathx is a fixed point of G, defined in (13), if and only if it has the following form:
where λ is a fixed point of F . Proof: See Appendix A. Theorem 3 states that there exists a one to one map between the fixed points of G (sustainable macroscopic behaviors) and the fixed points of the CDM F . As a result, one can compute all the sustainable macroscopic behaviors and anticipate the corresponding distributions of the choices between the alternatives. More precisely, for each λ = (λ 1 , . . . , λ l ) ∈ {0, . . . , N} l satisfying l i=1 λ = N , one can define the l regions H λ j and count the numbers η j of initial positions inside each region. If η j = λ j , for all j ∈ {1, . . . , l}, then λ is a fixed point of F . The map F may have multiple fixed points. Hence, an a priori agreement on how to choose λ should exist. For example, although noncooperative, the agents may anticipate that their majority will look for the most socially favorable Nash equilibrium if many exist and N is large. This λ corresponds to minimizing the total cost
}, which is also computable by just knowing the exact initial conditions of all the agents. Once the agents agree on a λ, they start tracking the corresponding fixed point defined by (22) . The fixed point vector λ describes the way the population splits between the destination points. In fact, λ j , j ∈ {1, . . . , l}, is the number of agents that go towards p j . When N is large, however, this algorithm is costly in terms of number of counting and verification operations. In the next section, we consider the limiting case of a large population with random initial conditions.
In the binary choice case, the quantities β 
We then derive in the following theorem, a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a fixed point path.
Theorem 4: For l = 2, the following statements hold. 1)x is a fixed point of G if and only if there exists a separating α ∈ {0, . . . , N} such that
For α = 0, 0 < β
where β 12 , δ 12 , θ 12 , and ξ 12 are defined in (12), (18) (23) , then an α satisfying (24)- (26) separates the population into two groups, the agents that go toward p 1 (with indices less or equal to α), and those that go towards p 2 (with indices greater than α).
Remark 1: For the scalar case (n = 1), Φ and Φ P are real exponential functions, which implies ξ 12 (p 1 − p 2 ) ≥ 0.
V. FIXED POINT-RANDOM INITIAL CONDITIONS
In this section, we assume that the agents' initial conditions x 0 i are random and i.i.d. on some probability space (Ω, F , P ) with distribution P 0 on R n . We assume an infinite size population. As in the deterministic case, we construct an one to one map between the fixed point paths and the fixed points of a finite-dimensional CDM. The latter characterizes the distribution of the choices between the alternatives. Moreover, we prove the existence of a fixed point and propose several methods to compute it.
We start our search for a fixed point path by consideringx in (3) given and call itx. By Lemma 1, there exist l regions D j (x) such that the agents initially in D j (x) select the control law (8) when trackingx. By substituting (10) into (8) and the resulting control law in (1), we show that the mean trajectory E(x i ) of a generic agent satisfies
where Ψ was defined after (9), Ex
.G s and its fixed points, if any, depend only on the initial statistical distribution of the agents.
We define the set
with
and p λ = l k =1 λ k p k , where β kj , δ kj , θ kj , and ξ kj are defined in (12) , (18) , and (19) .
Theorem 5, proved in Appendix B, shows the existence of a fixed point of F s using Brouwer's fixed point theorem. The latter requires continuity of F s , which is guaranteed by the following assumption.
Assumption 2: We assume that P 0 is such that the P 0 -measure of hyperplanes is zero.
Assumption 2 is satisfied when P 0 is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure for example. We now state the main result of this section.
Theorem 5: Under Assumption 2, the following statements hold.
1)x is a fixed point of G s if and only if there exists
forx(t) = R 1 (t)μ 0 + R 2 (t)p λ , where R 1 and R 2 are defined in (16) and (17) . 2) F s has at least one fixed point (equivalently G s has at least one fixed point). 3) For l = 2, if ξ 12 (p 1 − p 2 ) ≤ 0, then G s has a unique fixed point. In Theorem 5, 1) shows that computing the anticipated macroscopic behaviors is equivalent to computing all the vectors λ satisfying (30) under the corresponding constraint onx. To compute a λ satisfying (30), each agent is assumed to know the initial statistical distribution of the agents. As in the deterministic case, multiple λ's may exist. Hence, an a priori agreement on how to choose λ should exist. In that respect, the agents may implicitly assume that collectively they will opt for the λ (assuming it is unique!) that minimizes the total expected population cost
} (Γ, β k and δ k are defined in (6a)-(6c)), which can be evaluated if the agents know the initial statistical distribution of the population.
While in the deterministic case a fixed point of the CDM F determines the number of players that go to each destination point, in the stochastic case, a fixed point of F s is the vector of probabilities that an agent chooses each of the alternatives. The CDM F and F s defined, respectively, in the deterministic and stochastic cases have similar structures. In fact, in the deterministic case, if the sequence {x
of initial conditions is interpreted as a random variable on some probability space
The fixed points of the CDM F s characterize the game in terms of the number of what will be characterized in Section VII as -Nash equilibria, whether there is a consensus or disagreement and the distribution of the choices between the alternatives. In Section V-A, we investigate the question of computing these fixed points, while Section V-B treats the problem of uniqueness and multiplicity of these fixed points in the Gaussian binary choice case.
A. Computation of the Fixed Points
The map F s is not necessarily a contraction. Hence, it is sometimes impossible to compute its fixed points by the simple iterative method λ k +1 = F s (λ k ). 
(31) The sequence λ k converges to a fixed point of F s . In fact, given that ξ 12 (p 1 − p 2 ) > 0, [F s (t, 1 − t)] 1 increases with t. We show by induction that α k is monotone. But α k ∈ [0, 1], therefore, α k converges to some limit α. By the continuity of F s , (α, 1 − α) satisfies (30) . Since in this case F s may have multiple fixed points, the λ = (α, 1 − α) obtained using this approach depends on the initial value λ 0 = (α 0 , 1 − α 0 ). Moreover, the sequencē x k = R 1 (t)μ 0 + R 2 (t)p λ k converges to a fixed point of G s . The second method is applicable if ξ 12 (p 1 − p 2 ) ≤ 0. In this case, [F s (α, 1 − α) 1 − α decreases with α. Hence, one can compute the unique zero of this function by the bisection method.
2) General Case: In general (l ≥ 2), F s is a vector of probabilities of some regions delimited by hyperplanes. Although a fixed point could be computed using Newton's method, this is computationally expensive as it requires the values of the inverse of the Jacobian matrix at the root estimates. Alternatively, one can compute a fixed point of F s using a quasi-Newton method such as Broyden's method [45] (see Section VIII). Using this method, the inverse of the Jacobian can be estimated recursively provided that F s is continuously differentiable; this will be the case if the initial probability distribution has a continuous probability density function.
B. Gaussian Binary Choice Case
We have shown in Theorem 5 that for the binary choice case (l = 2), if ξ 12 (p 1 − p 2 ) < 0, then G s defined in (27) has a unique fixed point. We now prove that for the binary choice case and Gaussian initial distribution N (μ 0 , Σ 0 ), irrespective of the sign of ξ 12 (p 1 − p 2 ), G s has a unique fixed point provided that the initial spread of the agents is "sufficient." For any n × n matrix Σ such that (β 12 
where β 12 , δ 12 , θ 12 , and ξ 12 are defined in (12) , (18) Theorem 6 states that in the Gaussian binary choice case, if the initial distribution of the agents has enough spread, then the agents make their choices in a unique way. On the other hand, if the uncertainty in their initial positions is low enough and the mean of population is inside the region S(Σ 0 ) (a region delimited by two parallel hyperplanes), then the agents can anticipate the collective behavior in multiple ways.
VI. NONUNIFORM POPULATION WITH INITIAL PREFERENCES
Hitherto, the agents' initial affinities toward different potential targets are dictated only by their initial positions in space. In this section, the model is further generalized by considering that in addition to their initial positions, the agents are affected by their a priori opinion. When modeling smoking decision in schools, for example, [46] , this could represent a teenager's tendency toward "smoking" or "not smoking," which is the result of some endogenous factors such as parental pressure, financial condition, health, etc. When modeling elections, this would reflect personal preferences that transcend party lines. Moreover, we assume in this section that the agents have nonuniform dynamics.
We consider N agents with nonuniform dynamicṡ
with random initial states as in Section V. Player i is associated with the following individual cost:
In the costs (34), a small M ij relative to M ik , k = j, reflects an a priori affinity of agent i toward the destination p j .
As N tends to infinity, it is convenient to represent the limiting sequence of (θ i ) i∈{1,...,N } = ((A i , B i , M i1 , . . . , M il )) i∈{1,...,N } by a random vector θ. We assume that θ is in a compact set Θ. Let us denote the empirical measure of the sequence θ i as P N θ (A) = 1/N N i=1 1 {θ i ∈A} for all (Borel) measurable sets A. We assume that P N θ has a weak limit
For further discussions about this assumption, one can refer to [47] . We assume that the initial states x 0 i and θ are independent, and that an agent i knows its initial position x 0 i , its parameters θ i , as well as the distributions P 0 and P θ . We develop the following analysis for a generic agent with an initial position x 0 and parameters θ. Assuming an infinite size population, we start by trackingx(t), a posited deterministic although initially unknown continuous path. We can then show that, under the convention in Assumption 1, this tracking problem is associated with a unique optimal control law
where Γ 
with the final conditions Γ 
. . , l} (37) where
. In this case, the solutions of the Riccati equations (36a) depend on both the initial preference vector M θ and the destination points. Hence, the basins of attraction are now regions delimited by quadric surfaces in R n instead of hyperplanes. This fact complicates the structure of the operator that maps the tracked path to the mean. The existence proof for a fixed point relies now on an abstract Banach space version of Brouwer's fixed point theorem, namely Schauder's fixed point theorem [41] . We define
T , and Φ θ j is defined as in (9), where Π is replaced by Π θ j . The state trajectory of the generic agent, on {x 0 ∈ D θ j (x)}, is then equal to
Assumption 3: We assume that E x 0 2 < ∞. The functions defined by (36a)-(36c) are continuous with respect to θ, which belongs to a compact set. Moreover, θ and x 0 are assumed to be independent. Thus, under Assumption 3, the mean of the infinite size population can be computed using Fubini-Tonelli's theorem [48] as follows:
In the next theorem, we show that G p has a fixed point. We define
Since Θ and [0, T ] are compact and Φ θ j is continuous with respect to time and parameter θ, then k 1 , k 2 , and k 3 are well defined. Theorem 7, proved in Appendix B, establishes the existence of a fixed point of G p using Schauder's fixed point theorem. The latter requires boundedness of G p on bounded subsets of its domain and continuity of G p , which are guaranteed by the following two assumptions respectively.
Assumption 4: We assume that
Noting that the left-hand side of the inequality tends to zero as T goes to zero, Assumption 4 can be satisfied for a short time horizon T , for example.
Assumption 5: We assume that P 0 is such that the P 0 -measure of quadric surfaces is zero.
Assumption 5, similar to Assumption 2, is satisfied when P 0 is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, for example.
Theorem 7: Under Assumptions 3-5, G p has a fixed point. Note that if T goes to zero, the costs become decoupled, and each agent will choose the "closest" destination in the minimum energy sense. It is then expected that a Nash equilibrium exists in this case. Assumption 4 gives an upper bound on the time horizon T under which we can prove that such an equilibrium continues to exist.
VII. APPROXIMATE NASH EQUILIBRIUM
In the aforementioned three cases, deterministic, random initial conditions, and random initial conditions with nonuniform dynamics and initial preferences, we defined three maps G, G s , and G p , respectively [see (13) , (27) , and (39)]. Depending on the structure of the game, each player can anticipate the macroscopic behavior of the limiting population by computing a fixed pointx of G, G s , or G p , and compute its best response u * i (x i ,x) tox as defined in (8) and (35) . When considering the finite population, the next theorem establishes the importance of such decentralized strategies in that they lead to an -Nash equilibrium with respect to the costs (2), (3), and (34). This equilibrium makes the group's behavior robust in the face of potential selfish behaviors as unilateral deviations from the associated control policies are guaranteed to yield negligible cost reductions when N increases sufficiently.
Theorem 8: Under Assumption 3, the decentralized strategies u * i , i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, defined in (8) and (35) for a fixed point pathx, constitute an N -Nash equilibrium with respect to the costs J i (u i , u −i ), where N goes to zero as N increases to infinity.
Proof: See Appendix B.
VIII. SIMULATION RESULTS
To illustrate the collective decision-making mechanism, we consider a group of agents (robots) moving on the real line according to a second-order system,ẍ i = −3x i −ẋ i + u i , where x i is the position of robot i. They should move from their initial conditions towards the position 10, and arrive at the speed of 1, 4, or 10. Thus, in the state space (position, speed), the potential destination points are p 1 = (10, 10), p 2 = (10, 4), or p 3 = (10, 1). We draw N = 300 initial conditions from the Gaussian distribution P 0 N (0, I 2 ). We simulate two cases. In the first one, each agent knows the exact initial states of the other agents and anticipates the mean of the population accordingly. Following the counting and verification operations described at the end of Section IV, we find that F defined in (21) has a fixed point λ = (91, 209, 0). By implementing the control laws corresponding to this λ, 91 agents (30.33% of the agents) go toward p 1 and 209 (69.67% of the agents) toward p 2 (see Fig. 1 ). Moreover, the actual average replicates the anticipated mean as shown in this figure. In the second case, the agents know only the initial distribution P 0 of the agents. Then, Broyden's method converges to λ = (0.3066, 0.6921, 0.0013) satisfying (30) . Accordingly, 30.66% of the agents go towards p 1 , 69.21% toward p 2 and the rest toward p 3 (see Fig. 2 ). The actual average and the anticipated mean are approximately the same.
To illustrate the social effect on the individual choices (see Fig. 3 ), we consider the same initial conditions. Without social effect (q = 0), (0.4146, 0.5843, 0.0011) satisfies (30) . In this case, the majority goes toward p 2 . As the social effect increases to q = 5, some of the agents that went toward p 1 in the absence of a social effect change their decisions and follow the majority toward p 2 (see yellow balls in Fig. 3 ). In this case, (0.1775, 0.8216, 0.0009) satisfies (30) . If the social impact increases more to q = 30, then a consensus to follow the majority occurs. Fig. 4 shows that as the social effect increases, the basin of attraction of p 2 (blue area) increases at the expenses of the two other basins. To illustrate the impact of the individual efforts on the behavior of the population (see Fig. 5 ), we start with the case where the control effort is inexpensive (r = 1). In this case, λ = (0.3066, 0.6921, 0.0013) is a fixed point of F s , defined in (28) . As the effort coefficient increases (r = 5), the majority of the agents that went to p 1 in the previous case (r = 1) choose a closer alternative, namely p 2 (yellow balls). Moreover, some of the agents that chose p 2 move now toward a less expensive choice p 3 (yellow balls). In this case, λ = (0.0097, 0.9085, 0.0819). As r increases to 10, more players change their choices from p 2 to p 1 (yellow balls), and λ is equal to (0.0004, 0.6664, 0.3332) in this case.
To illustrate the Gaussian binary choice case, we consider a group of agents initially drawn from the normal distribution N (μ 0 , I 2 ) and moving according to the same dynamics toward the destination points p 1 = (−10, 0) or p 2 = (10, 0). Now the robots are moving on the real line toward −10 or 10, where they must arrive at a speed 0. For the covariance matrix Σ 0 = I 2 , S(Σ 0 ) defined in (32) is the region delimited by the lines y = . 6 ).
IX. CONCLUSION
We consider in this paper a dynamic collective choice model where a large number of agents are choosing between multiple destination points while taking into account the social effect as represented by the mean of the population. The analysis is carried using the MFG methodology. We show that under this social effect, the population may split between the destination points in different ways. For a uniform population, we show that there exists a one to one map between the self-replicating mean trajectories and the fixed points of a function defined on R l . The latter describe the way the agents split between the l destination points. Finally, we prove that the decentralized strategies optimally tracking the self-replicating mean trajectories are approximate Nash equilibria. We suspect that in the uniform case the linear dynamics and the quadratic running costs are necessary to reduce the infinite dimensional fixed point problem to a finite-dimensional one. It is of interest for future work to extend our analysis to a model where players have stochastic dynamics as well. In that case, the optimal choices (feedback strategies) change along the path according to the occurring events (noise). This is in contrast to the current formulation where the agents can choose without loss of optimality their destination before they start moving. Also, we would like to extend the current formulation to certain nonlinear models, where the basins of attraction are delimited by more complex manifolds, and the fixed-point computations would require numerical methods for backward-forward systems of partial differential equations [49] .
APPENDIX A
This appendix includes the proofs of lemmas and theorems related to the tracking and fixed point problems in case of deterministic initial conditions.
A. Proof of Lemma 2: In this proof, the subscript M indicates the dependence on the final cost's coefficient M . For any M > 0, the agents are optimally tracking a pathx M . The agent i optimal state is denoted by x * iM (t). We have 
which is uniformly bounded with M , sincex M is uniformly bounded with M . Thus, for all > 0, there exists an
Lemma 9: For any λ = (λ 1 , . . . , λ l ) ∈ {0, . . . , N} l , T λ has a unique fixed point equal to
where R 1 and R 2 are defined in (16) and (17) 
. Proof: Consider y a fixed point of T λ . We define
where Γ and Φ are defined in (6a) and (9) . One can easily check that (y, n) satisfieṡ
Therefore, y and n are, respectively, the optimal state and costate of the following LQR problem:
Hence, n has the representation n(t) = P (t)y(t) + g(t), where P is the unique solution of the Riccati equation (20) and g satisfiesġ = −(A − 1 r BB T P (t)) T g, with g(T ) = −Mp λ . By solving g and implementing its expression in n = P y + g, and by implementing the new expression of n in the dynamics of y, one can show that y(t) = R 1 (t)x 0 + R 2 (t)p λ . Conversely, let (n, y) be the unique solution of (42) . We define m(t) = Γ(t)y(t) + q
, with m(T ) = n(T ). Therefore, n = m, and from (42) , y is a fixed point of T λ .
We now prove the uniform boundedness of the fixed point paths y λ with respect to (M, λ). The paths y λ are the optimal states of the control problem (43) . Since (A, B) is controllable, the corresponding optimal control law u λ satisfies 
We have
for some positive constants K 1 , K 2 , K 3 , which are independent of (M, λ). Hence, y λ is uniformly bounded with (M, λ).
C. Proof of Theorem 3:
Ifx is a fixed point of G, thenx is a fixed point of the map T λ(x) , with T λ defined in the previous subsection. By Lemma 9, x is of the form (22) . To show that λ(x) is a fixed point of F , we replace the new expression of the fixed pointx (22) in the expressions of the basins of attraction, which will then have the following form:
Thus, we proved that ifx is a fixed point of G, thenx is of the form (22) , where λ = λ(x) is a fixed point of the finitedimensional operator F defined in (21) .
To prove the converse, we consider a fixed point λ of F and the pathx = R 1 (t)x 0 + R 2 (t)p λ . We have
where the third equality is a consequence of the form ofx. By Lemma 9, the pathx is the unique fixed point of T λ . But then
Therefore,x is a fixed point of G.
D. Proof of Theorem 4:
The first point follows from Theorem 3 and (23). For 2) and 3), we define
We start by proving 2 (24), (25) , or (26) .
APPENDIX B
In this appendix, we provide the proofs of theorems related to the fixed point problems in the random initial conditions and nonuniform population cases, as well as the proof of Theorem 8, which characterizes the decentralized control laws developed in Sections III-VI as -Nash strategies.
A. Proof of Theorem 5: We start by proving 1). Let x be a fixed point of G s and λ j = P 0 (D j (x)). By replacing the probabilities in the expression of G s by λ j , j ∈ {1, . . . , l}, we getx = G s (x) = T λ (x), where λ = (λ 1 , . . . , λ l ) and T λ is defined before Lemma 9. Hence,x is a fixed point of T λ . By Lemma 9,x(t) = R 1 (t)μ 0 + R 2 (t)p λ . By replacing this expression ofx in D j (x) (11), we get λ = F s (λ). Conversely, consider λ = (λ 1 , . . . , λ l ) in Δ l such that λ = F s (λ) and let x(t) = R 1 (t)μ 0 + R 2 (t)p λ . The pathx is the unique fixed point of T λ and
Hence,x = T λ (x) = G s (x). We now prove the second point. Noting that the set Δ l is convex and compact in R l , we just need to show that F s is continuous. Then, Brouwer's fixed point theorem [41] ensures the existence of a fixed point. Let λ r be a sequence in Δ l converging to λ. We have (29) , are regions delimited by hyperplanes. Hence, under Assumption 2
| ≤ 2 and converges to zero for all x in R n . Thus, by the Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem [48] , the integral of this function converges to zero. This proves that F s is continuous. Finally, we prove 3). For l = 2, the fixed points of F s are of the form (α, 1 − α). The set of fixed points of F s is compact. Thus, the set of the first components of these fixed points is compact. Let α 0 be the minimum of those first components. Consider α > α 0 . Hence 
C. Proof of Theorem 7:
We use Schauder's fixed point theorem [41] to prove the existence of a fixed point. We start by showing that G p is a compact operator, i.e., G p is continuous and maps bounded sets to relatively compact sets. We have 
where R is a continuous positive function on 
In the following, we prove that this potential cost improvement is bounded by some N that converges to zero as N increases to infinity. We denote, respectively, by x i and x * j the states corresponding to u i and u * j . In view of (34), the compactness of Θ, the continuity of x * j with respect to θ and E x 0 i 2 < ∞, the right-hand side of (45) In view of (45) 
